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21. Introduction
An idea that has existed for some time in the Industrial Organization literature
is that a firm may be able to obtain a strategic advantage by increasing a rival or
potential rivals’ costs. However, despite the appeal as a theoretical idea there has been
much debate concerning applications to ‘real-world’ scenarios. One explanation is
that much of the evidence cited of this form of strategic conduct is simply an
alternative way of approaching more established forms of anti-competitive behaviour
such as foreclosure.1 The recent Office of Fair Trading (OFT) (2003) Merger
Guidelines state that one of the competition concerns with vertical mergers is that
they can have a raising rivals’cost effect and foreclose market access. The existing
literaturefocuses largely on the strategic raising of rivals’ variable costs.However, as
Mason (2002) shows the scope for such a strategy to be profitable is limited because
in many scenarios raising a rival firms costs leads to an identical increase in the firms
own costs. There are however, situations where raising rivals fixed costs may be a
more plausible strategy, such as the costs of complying with regulation. It will be
shown that this can still be a profitable strategy despite the increase in fixed costs
affecting all firms equally. In addition much of the recent Industrial Organisation
literature has focused on the importance of sunk costs, whereas this paper considers
fixed costs that do not have to be sunk costs. A set of guidelines produced by OFT
(2002) highlight the potential effect regulation can have on competition. It is
recognized that regulation can have a substantial efect on firm’s costs and may 
disadvantage certain firms, for example, smaller firms. The impact of regulation on
competition therefore has important policy implications, especially if the strategic
raising of costs leads to a reduction in competition. However, despite the important
policy implications this is currently an under-researched area.
This paper is firstly an attempt to formalise the possibility of strategically
raising the level of fixed costs in an industry, by adapting an idea suggested in Dixit
(1979). The model is then used in an attempt to analyze the use of lobbying for
regulation or alternatively pursuing legal proceedings to raise fixed costs and
disadvantage rivals. The lobbying for regulation application potentially applies to a
wide variety of types of regulation including; various codes-of-practise, the regulation
of professional services, environmental and health and safety regulation. The
1 See for example Brennan (1988) and Coate and Kleit (1994).
3literature review in the subsequent section provides some important examples of the
possible strategic use of regulation, for example in the US ophthalmic industry.
The potential strategic use of legal proceedings is becoming an increasingly
relevant issue as it has been suggested that the European Commission is now
encouraging competition law to be enforced via private litigation.2 Some early
examples where this form of strategic behaviour has been claimed in the European
courts are provided later in the paper. Regulation and legal proceedings are therefore
perhaps less obvious but extremely plausible settings for the use of a raising rivals’ 
costs (RRC) strategy and are not covered by the existing literature.
The paper proceeds as follows; section 2 summarises the relevant literatures
from economics and law, section 3 formalises the effect of symmetric increases in
fixed costs in a Cournot model and considers the implications for consumer welfare.
Then section 4 discusses the possible approaches to the equilibrium selection
problems that arise when fixed costs are present and applies these in the context of;
regulation and ‘nuisance’ law suits, finally section 5 concludes.
2. Relevant Literature
The classic RRC model is by Salop and Scheffman (1983 & 1987). In these
papers, it is suggested that RRC may be a more realistic strategy for a firm than
predatory pricing; the main reasons for this are that a RRC strategy is more credible,
does not require the rival to exit the market and allows short run gains. Their model
uses a dominant firm, competitive fringe setup to show how strategic RRC can be
achieved. Crucial to the model is a variable-cost raising parameter, which can for
example be interpreted as a regulatory parameter, the price of an input or expenditure
on R&D. The model shows that a RRC strategy is profitable if the increase in this cost
raising parameter leads to an increase in the dominant firm’s residual demand, which 
exceeds the shift in its average cost curve. They show that this may have a negative or
a positive effect on the fringefirm’sprofits and on consumer welfare. More structure
is then placed on the cost raising parameter to illustrate a RRC strategy in a more
realistic setting. They firstly model overbuying strategies when increasing the
purchase of an input raises rivals costs and secondly vertical integration. It is shown
to be potentially profitable for a vertically integrated dominant firm to purchase an
2 Jones and Surfin (2001), pp. 958.
4input from elsewhere, even if it can produce the input more efficiently itself, because
of the RRC effect.
One example of a RRC strategy is discussed in Williamson (1968). In a case
brought against Pennington, a US mining firm in the 1960s, it was alleged that they
used a wage agreed with the labour union in order to RRC. By increasing the wage,
variable costs for all firms would go up, effecting labour-intensive firms more and
potentially benefiting Pennington as a more capital-intensive firm. The court despite
finding some evidence of RRC could not prove intent and consequently no action was
taken. However, Williamson suggests that there was in fact evidence of intent and that
this strategy despite not actually giving Pennington monopoly power had a significant
effect on discouraging small scale entry and forced some firms to exit the market.
Mason (2002) provides an alternative rationale for a RRC strategy by showing
that in a dynamic setting a symmetric increase in variable costs can be profitable for
all firms if it leads to a subsequent reduction in competition.
The term government assisted predation was introduced by Miller and Pautler
(1985).3 They define government-assisted predation as; ‘firms eforts to use the 
coercive powers of government for their own advantage against their rivals’.4 They
suggest that there is little ‘real-world’evidence of successful predatory pricing
strategies and that the use of predation strategies involving non-price variables, for
example, government assisted predation, could be much more plausible. As a possible
example, they suggest that a larger firm can disadvantage a smaller rival by filling for
a law-suit. Even if this costs both firms an identical amount they argue that the larger
firm can obtain an advantage. This law-suit could be interpreted as a fixed cost
imposed on the smaller firm. It is suggested that the FTC and other government
agencies now recognize the potential anti-competitive effects of this form of conduct
and have moved to counter the effects and expanded the focus of traditional anti-trust
activities to recognise this. In addition Baumol and Ordover (1985) suggest the
potential use of antitrust action to deter competition, for example moves to deter entry
by a rival firm or to prevent rival firms setting up a joint venture.5 All of these
examples of government assisted predation can be regarded as attempts to increase or
impose some form of fixed costs on a rival firm. The model described in the
3 See also Bork (1978).
4 Miller and Paulter (1985), pp.500.
5 Baumol and Ordover (1985), pp.256-57, MCI v AT&T and the GM-Toyota Joint Venture.
5proceeding sections of this paper therefore, formalises this form of strategic
behaviour.
The model developed in section 3 of this paper is based on the model in Dixit
(1979), which shows that the presence of fixed costs can enable an incumbent
monopolist to deter entry by a comparable sized rival firm. It is shown that if fixed
costs are high enough the incumbent firm can blockade entry by continuing to
produce as a monopolist. However, with lower fixed costs entry deterrence may still
be possible if the incumbent produces an output in excess of the monopoly level. The
model described in the proceeding sections is similar to that of Dixit however the
crucial difference is that the model is now used to consider strategic increases in fixed
costs as the level of fixed costs is modelled as a choice variable.In contrast in Dixit’s 
model fixed costs are exogenously determined.
The idea that a firm may be able to strategically use regulation was first
formalized by Oster (1982). The case of branded US generic drugs in the late 1970s is
used as an example; evidence suggests that the producers of brand name drugs
lobbied for regulation, which would disadvantage producers of the equivalent generic
drugs. The strategic lobbying for regulation is also modelled in Michaelis (1994),
where two political parties compete for campaign contributions by firms in an
industry subject to regulation.
Another example of the possible strategic use of the regulatory process to
deter entry is provided in the US ophthalmic industry. Haas-Wilson (1986) shows that
in this industry commercial practise restriction such as restrictions on optical store
locations and the operation of multiple stores have lead to increased prices. Then
Haas-Wilson (1989) finds empirical evidence that these commercial practise
restrictions limited chain-store entry into the market and suggests that self-employed
opticians successfully lobbied for these commercial practise restrictions to deter entry.
3. i) The basic model: symmetric increases in fixed costs in a Cournot model
Assume a standard Cournot model, where there are 2 firms denoted 1 and 2,
producing homogenous goods and facing the inverse demand function:
( )P Q a bQ  where: 1 2Q q q  (1)
6The two firms have identical marginal costs ( )c and potentially a fixed cost ( )F . We
will assume that either of the two firms can take some discrete action which leads
to an increase in industry wide fixed costs.6 Formally:
( )F g where:  0,g  and 0 (2)
We will also assume that that fixed costs are increasing in the actionand initially
that if no action is taken there are no fixed costs, formally;
( ) 0F  and (0) 0F  (3)
It will be assumed that affects the two firms fixed costs equally so that the two
firms always have identical fixed costs. Total costs for each firm are therefore;
. ( )i iTC c q F   (4)
We can then find the best-reply function for a given firm taking into account the fact
that when fixed costs are present the firm has the option to exit the industry when the
best-reply to a given output choice by a rival involves non-positive profits7 (see
Appendix 1.1):
( ) 0i jBR q  iff  ( ) / 4jq a c b F   (5)
  ( ) ( ) / 2 / 2i j jBR q a c b q   iff  ( ) / 4jq a c b F   (5.1)
Proposition 1 then shows that the set of equilibria depends on the level of fixed costs.
Proposition 1: If 0 then the set of equilibria available depends on the level of
fixed costs:
i) *1( )F g F The Cournot equilibrium is unique.
ii) * *1 2( )F F F  There are three equilibria; firm 1 as a monopolist, firm 2 as a
monopolist or the Cournot equilibrium.
iii) * *2 3( )F F F  There are two equilibria; firm 1 as a monopolist and firm 2 as a
monopolist.
iv) *3 ( )F F  No firm is active.
6 The action is assumed to be discrete for simplicity however; it could also be modelled as a
continuous action.
7 Exit is assumed to be costless.
7Where *1F ,
*
2F and
*
3F are defined in Appendix 1.2.
The intuition behind Proposition 1 can be explained diagrammatically. Figure 1 shows
the effect that fixed costs have on the standard Cournot best-reply diagram:
Figure 1: Best-replies in the presence of fixed costs
From Figure 1, as fixed costs continue to be increased for both firms the zero
profit point along each best-reply curve approaches the Nash equilibrium. There is a
critical point at which the effect of increasing fixed costs has a significant effect, this
is the output level at which the best-reply to the rival firm producing the monopoly
quantity is to produce no output. This critical value for fixed costs is *1F . Figure 2
shows the revised best-reply diagram when fixed costs exceed this critical value.
q
1BR
2BR
1 0
2 0
2q
1q
*
2q
*
1q
8Figure 2: Best-reply diagram for increased fixed costs
In Figure 2 1q and 2q are each firms best-replies to their rival producing the
monopoly outcome. The fixed costs are at a high enough level so that these best-reply
quantities would result in the firm making a loss, and this firm would therefore prefer
to exit the market.8 By inspection there are therefore three Nash equilibrium to this
game; Firm 1 as a monopolist with Firm 2 exiting the market and vice versa, or the
Cournot Nash equilibrium outcome described earlier (but with lower profits due to the
fixed costs). All three of these Nash equilibria yield non-negative profits for both
firms.
We can now analyse the situation in which fixed costs are increased even
further so that the Cournot Nash equilibrium is no longer an option because at the
relevant quantities both firms make zero profits, as shown in Figure 3.
8 It is assumed that exit is costless.
2q
1BR
2BR
1 0
2 0*2q
2q
2monq
*
1q 1monq 1q1q
9Figure 3: Best-reply diagram for a further increase in fixed costs
The critical value for the fixed costs that leads to this outcome as *2F . By inspection
we can see that if fixed costs exceed this level then there are two pure strategy Nash
equilibria, involving one the two firms as a monopolist.
ii) Welfare
Corollary 1: In proposition 1 for the levels of fixed costs where multiple equilibria
exist ((ii) and (iii)) consumer surplus is highest at the Cournot equilibrium and is
unaffected by the level of fixed costs given that the Cournot outcome remains the
equilibrium. The consumer welfare loss which occurs if fixed costs are raised to any
level above *1F and a monopoly outcome results is the same for all
*
3 1 *F F F  .
If *3F F consumer surplus is zero as no firm provides the product (see Appendix 1.3).
4. The Equilibrium Selection Problem and Applications
Section 3 has shown that for 0 i.e. some action taken by the two firms to
increase fixed costs, if fixed costs are within a certain range defined in ii) and iii) in
proposition 1, there are multiple Nash equilibria. There are a number of possible
1BR
2BR
2 0
1 0
2q
2monq
*
2q
1q
1monq
*
1q
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approaches to the equilibrium selection problem, which will now be considered and
applied to a number of potential sources for the increase in fixed costs.
One way in which fixed costs could be strategically raised is by using the
regulatory process as discussed in the introduction. Many different forms of
regulation impose significant costs on firms competing within an industry or firms
considering entering an industry. Various examples described in the literature review
provide evidence of lobbying for regulation by firms with the suggestion that the aim
was to disadvantage rivals or deter potential rivals. An alternative form of raising
fixed costs strategycould be the use of a ‘nuisance’ law suit, which informaly can be 
defined as a law-suit imposed on a rival firm with the aim of disadvantaging them
rather than for the claimed infringement for which the case is taken. The following
quote suggests an example of a nuisance-suit to disadvantage a rival firm; the
Managing Director of HOVIS, on learning that a case against a rival firm for trade-
mark infringement had been unsuccessful was alleged to have said:
‘Wel, that wil teach them to infringeour trade-mark.’9
This quote from Whish (2003) shows that the European Commission recognises the
potential for law-suits to be used for strategic purposes:
‘The Commission acknowledges that undertakings have a fundamental 
right of access to a judge but considers that a dominant undertaking might
be guilty of an abuse where litigation cannot reasonably be considered as
an attempt to establish rights but instead serves to harass the other party
and where it is conceived in the framework of a plan whose goal is to
eliminate competition.’10
Whish goes on to suggest that this form of behaviour is particularly likely to be a
problem in industries in which intellectual property rights are particularly important,
for example the pharmaceutical and bio-technology industries, because in these
industries threats of action and action against infringement are often observed.
Examples of complaints concerning ‘nuisance’ law-suits in European cases include
9 Dawson, N. and Firth, A., (2000), pp. 14.
10 Whish (2003), pp. 679-80.
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the BBI/Boosey & Hawkes case where Boosey and Hawkes was alleged to have
claimed copyright breaches in the UK and Germany to exclude a new entrant from the
market. In a similar fashion in Promedia v Commission, Promedia a firm in the
Belgium telecommunications industry claimed that Belacom had abused its dominant
position by taking legal action at the national level against them.11 We would expect
the cost allocation rules for litigation cases to be an important determinant in the
possibility of using ‘nuisance’ law suits for strategic objectives. In the US al parties 
pay their own costs whereas generally in the UK the loser of the case must pay all the
costs associated.12 Therefore, given these cost allocation rules we would expect
‘nuisance’ law-suits to be a more plausible strategy in the US. This may also partly
explain the fact that private litigation cases are much more common in the US.
i) Simultaneous production and a possible potentially ambiguous increase in
fixed costs
The proceeding analysis will make it clear that for any given firm the potential
profitability of a strategy of increasing fixed costs depends on the precise details of
the strategies the firms each have. One possibility is that an increase in fixed costs can
occur but the source of the increase is not common knowledge. This would be for
example a possibly scenario in the case of lobbying for regulation. Any given firm
knowing that they did not lobby for regulation themselves may still be unable to
attribute any fixed cost increasing regulation to an action by a rival firm or simply
government intervention not brought about by lobbying. In addition it will initially be
assumed that when Cournot competition takes place the firms production decisions
are made simultaneously. These two assumptions lead to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: When any given firm cannot attribute an increase in fixed costs to an
action by a rival firm and output decisions are made simultaneously a strategy to raise
fixed costs cannot be profitable (see Appendix 2).
The intuition underlying Proposition 2 is simply that raising fixed costs is only
profitable if it allows the firm to monopolize the industry. However, when output
11 BBI/Bossey & Hawkes and Promedia v Commission in Jones and Surfin (2001), pp.423. In both
cases the complaints were not upheld by the Commission. Suggesting that in some cases complaints of
this nature may also be made for strategic reasons.
12 Bevan, Fenn and Rickman (1998), pp. 9.
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levels are determined simultaneously a firm undertaking a strategy to increase fixed
costs does not have a chance to monopolize the industry as the outcome in the
quantity competition stage will be the Cournot equilibrium.13
ii) A first-mover advantage in the product market
In contrast to the above scenario we can now alter the game and give one
player a first-mover advantage in the output setting stage. This could for example be
an incumbent firm in the industry which can provide its output to the market before
the arrival of any potential entrant. In this case the incumbent could lobby for
regulation which increases fixed costs. Alternatively an incumbent firm could use a
law-suit against a potential entrant for example by claiming patent infringement.
Allowing a first-mover advantage in the product market leads to the following
proposition:
Proposition 3: An increase in fixed costs such that * *2 1F F F  is a profitable
strategy for a firm with a first-mover advantage in the product market (see Appendix
3.1).
The intuition is again simple, the first mover advantage means that once fixed
costs have been raised this firm can produce the monopoly output which due to the
strategic increase in fixed costs for a rival firm the best-reply is to produce no output.
In this way therefore, the firm with the first-mover advantage can force a rival firm to
exit the market or prevent the entry of a rival.
The preceding analysis has shown that when 0 the first firm to
produce its output can produce the monopoly quantity and effectively foreclose the
market. However, it may be that ‘mistakes’ occur i.e. both firms believe that they are
producing first and therefore, both produce the monopoly quantity. Corollary 2 shows
the effect this has on consumer surplus.
Corollary 2: If the probability of mistakes occurring is greater that approximately 0.26
then consumer surplus is higher if the required increase in fixed costs takes place (see
Appendix 3.2).
13 In the case where *2F F , this outcome will involve a war of attrition and therefore other
considerations such as ‘deep-purses’ become important. 
13
This is due to the fact that two firms both producing the monopoly output
forces price down to marginal cost and consumer surplus is therefore, higher than at
the Cournot equilibrium. If this occurs with a high enough probability compared to
the probability of the alternative monopoly outcome consumer welfare increases.
iii) A unilateral fixed costs raising strategy - forward induction
An alternative approach to considering the equilibrium selection problem to
the game and assume only one firm, say firm 1 can make the decision as to whether or
not to increase industry wide fixed costs. In the context of the regulation to increase
fixed costs this could occur because only one firm has access to the regulatory process
or in the law-suit example if only one firm has the potential to claim some
infringement. Figure’s4 and 5 show the extensive form of this game when the action
( ) raises fixed costs to *1F and *2F respectively, the pure strategy Nash equilibria are
labelled NE and the player’sstrategies are restricted to possible equilibrium
strategies:
Figure 4: The extensive form game of an increase in fixed costs
14
Figure 5: The extensive form game of a further increase in fixed costs
Proposition 4: When * *3 1F F F  and only firm 1 can take the action to increase
fixed costs, there are two pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibria (PBNE);
0 1 monq q 2 0q  and 0 1 2 courq q q  (see Appendix 4.1).
The intuition is the same for * *2 1F F F  and * *3 2F F F  , firm 2 knows that it is
only profitable for firm 1 to increase fixed costs if firm 1 goes on to monopolize the
market. The only consistent belief for firm 2 is therefore that once fixed costs have
been raised player 1 will produce the monopoly output and therefore firm 2 should
exit the industry even when the output decisions are made simultaneously.
Alternatively if no action has been taken by firm 1 the equilibrium is simply the
Cournot outcome. Proposition 6 however refines the equilibrium selection process
further by using the forward induction refinement.
Proposition 5: Using forward induction the unique equilibrium for * *2 1F F F  when
only firm 1 can take the action is 0 and 1 monq q 2 monq q (see Appendix 4.2).
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Forward induction removes the PBNE with fixed costs at zero because firm 1 can
reason forward and knows that if fixed costs are strategically increased the resulting
PBNE is more profitable than the outcome which occurs without this strategy.
Propositions 4 and 5 therefore illustrate that an asymmetry in access to the
means to strategically increase fixed costs has a substantial impact on the predicted
outcome. A firm with the means to strategically increase fixed costs is able to credibly
commitment to producing the monopoly output even when output decisions are made
simultaneously. This commitment allows the firm to monopolize the market and a
raising fixed costs strategy is therefore profitable.
5. Conclusion
The basic model in Section 3 has shown that a strategy of symmetrically raising
fixed costs can be profitable. However, in the case where both firms can take some
action to raise fixed costs this requires the firm to have either a first-mover advantage
in production or alternatively at least a high enough probability of producing first. In
contrast if only a single firm has the possibility of taking the action to raise fixed costs
then the forward induction argument shows that the firm can credibly commit to
monopolizing the industry. The standard raising rivals costs literature as already
stated, focuses on variable costs but this paper has shown that a raising fixed costs
strategy can in certain scenarios be more applicable. In addition as already discussed
it has previously been shown that a raising rival’s variable costs strategy generally
requires the rival firm(s) costs to increase by more than the costs of the firm using the
strategy. However, the strategic behaviour considered in this paper has always
assumed the often more plausible setting where the two firms fixed costs are affected
equally. The paper analyzed two possible applications for a raising fixed costs
strategy; regulation and ‘nuisance’ law suits. Comparing these two possible
applications for raising rivals fixed costs to deter entry the use of regulation would
seem to be more likely to succeed in a dynamic setting as it involves increasing a
fixed cost that will exist for every period rather than a once only cost. This
consequently reduces the profitability of such a strategy but crucially this strategy also
prevents future entry attempts without relying on the creation of reputation effects. It
is also likely that some of the regulation brought about by lobbying is in fact
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beneficial to society.14 If this is the case then the welfare loss generated by such a
strategy may be less than in the law-suit example.15
The main policy implications from the paper are firstly that as suggested by the
OFT (2002) regulation can have an adverse effect on competition in certain scenarios
and therefore that policy makers should consider this impact on the industry. In
addition the fact that ‘nuisance’ law-suits may be used for strategic purposes suggests
that caution should be taken in advancing the private enforcement of competition
policy. Courts should be aware of the use of legal proceedings in this manner and as
much as possible the burden of proof should fall on the firm making the claims of
infringement by their rivals. Importantly the cost-allocation rules for litigation cases
in the UK appear to be structured to reduce the possibility of strategic ‘nuisance’ law-
suits and this may have important implications for the different cost-allocation rules
used in other countries such as the US.
Finally, this paper has focused on the strategic increase in fixed costs to deter
entry or force a rival to exit the industry. There are however, at least two possible
alternative motives for a raising fixed costs strategy which are worth noting and may
provide avenues for further research. One alternative rationale for such a strategy is
suggested in Durham et al (2004). If at least part of the fixed costs is, a sunk fixed
cost then firms may prefer to stay in the industry and make losses rather than
immediately exit the industry. A change in industry conduct i.e. a more towards more
collusive behaviour however, would potentially allow all firms to continue to make
positive profits, thus leading to an inefficient number of firms to compete in the
industry. Therefore, the motive for raising industry wide fixed costs could be to
change conduct in the industry rather than to attempt to force a rival to exit the
industry. This is similar to the idea in Mason (2002), mentioned above, where a
symmetric increase in marginal costs reduces competition. An experiment conducted
by Durham et al using a double-auction experiment in a Bertrand setting, found some
evidence that when large fixed costs were present, price signalling behaviour took
place to attempt to reduce competition, enabling firms to maintain profitable. A
similar motive is provided by the ‘failing firm’ defence to mergers. Increasing fixed
14 i.e. some proportion of the increase in the fixed costs should be included in total welfare because of
the benefits the regulation brings such as regulation that improves safety standards.
15 Assuming the law-suit method is also successful in deterring future entry.
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costs such that one or both of the firms involved in a merger is not profitable may
encourage leniency to the merger from the competition authorities.
Appendix
Appendix 1.1
Proof that:
( ) 0i jBR q  iff  ( ) / 4jq a c b F  
  ( ) ( ) / 2 / 2i j jBR q a c b q   iff  ( ) / 4jq a c b F  
For the standard Cournot game described in Section 3 i) the best-reply function for
firm i is given by:
( ) (( ) / 2 ) ( / 2)i j jBR q a c b q   (6)
It is then possible to solve forfirm i’sprofits for a best-reply to any output by firm j:
( ( ), ) ( )i i j j j i iBR q q a bq bq q F     (7)
Substituting (6) into (7):
  ( ( ), ) (( ) / 2 ) / 2 (( ) / 2 ) / 2i i j j j j jBR q q a bq b a c b q a c b q F           (8)
Rearranging this expression gives:
( ( ), ) ( ) 4i i j j jBR q q a c bq F     (8.1)
Therefore;
( ( ), ) 0i i j jBR q q  iff ( ) 4ja c bq F   (9)
Firm i therefore produces ( )i jBR q iff ( ) 4ja c bq F  
Rearranging (9) and combing this with equation (6) gives equation (5.1).
Otherwise firm i produces zero output, which gives equation (5).
Appendix 1.2
Proof of Proposition 1:
At 1 *F the level of fixed costs are sufficiently high such that the best-reply for firm i
to firm j producing the monopoly output results in non-positive profit.
18
First of all solving for the monopoly price and output:
( ) / 2monq a c b  (10)
( ) / 2monp a c  (11)
Using equation (6):
( ) (( ) / 2 ) ( / 2)i j jBR q a c b q  
Substituting in for j monq q :
( ) ( ) / 4i monBR q a c b  (12)
The resulting price is therefore:
( , ( )) ( 3 ) / 4mon j monp q BR q a c  (13)
This leads to the following profit for firm i:
2
1( ) /16 *i a c b F   (14)
When fixed costs are at 2 *F profits at the Cournot outcome are zero.
Solving for the price, quantity and profit levels to the Cournot game yields:
( ) / 3courq a c b  (15)
( 2 ) / 3courp a c  (16)
2
2( ) / 9 *cour a c b F    (17)
When fixed costs are at 3 *F a monopolist makes zero profits, using (10) and (11):
2
3( ) / 4 *mon a c b F    (18)
Appendix 1.3
Proof of Corollary 1:
From (15) and (16) consumer surplus at the Cournot equilibrium is:
  (( 2 ) / 3) 2( ) / 3 / 2courCS a a c a c b      22( ) / 9a c b  (19)
This level of consumer surplus at the Cournot equilibrium is unchanged regardless of
the level of fixed costs as long as there are two firms in the market.
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However, as Proposition 1 shows if fixed costs are such that 1 3* *F F F  a
monopoly outcome becomes possible in equilibrium. If a monopoly outcome occurs
the resulting consumer surplus, using (10) and (11) is given by:
  ( ) / 2) ( ) / 2 / 2monCS a a c a c b      2( ) / 8a c b  (20)
Again the level of consumer surplus is independent of the level of fixed costs as long
as only a single firm exists in equilibrium.
Comparing (18) and (19) clearly the consumer surplus at the Cournot outcome is
always higher than at the monopoly outcome i.e.:
2 22( ) / 9 ( ) / 8a c b a c b   (21)
If 3 *F F no firm produces an output as it is not profitable to do so. Therefore;
0CS  (22)
Appendix 2
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider an increase in fixed costs to 1 *F F because this increase cannot be
attributed to the action of a particular firm it does not act as a commitment to a given
output in the product market. In addition because output decisions are then made
simultaneously each firm expects the other firm to produce the Cournot output and
thus produces the best-reply to this, i.e. the Cournot output.
The profit for firm i if fixed costs are raised to 1 *F F are thus:
cour F  (23)
Assuming if firm i does not strategically increase fixed costs 0F  , firm i’s profits
are:
cour (24)
Clearly;
cour cour F   (25)
Therefore, a strategy to increase fixed costs to 1 *F F is not profitable.
Appendix 3.1
Proof of Proposition 3:
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Assume without loss of generality that firm i has a first-mover advantage in the
product market, this means that if 1 3* *F F F  firm i can potentially monopolize the
market. This is a profitable strategy for firm i iff:
( , ( ))mon mon j monF q BR q   (26)
Using (14) to define 1 *F and (18):
2
1* 3( ) /16mon F a c b    (27)
From (6) and (10):
2( , ( )) ( ) / 8mon j monq BR q a c b   (28)
Clearly (27) is greater than (28) and therefore increasing fixed costs to 1 *F is a
profitable strategy for firm i.
Similarly, if 2 *F F , using (17) and (18):
2
2* 5( ) / 36mon F a c b    (29)
Comparing (29) with (28) shows that increasing fixed costs to 2 *F is a profitable
strategy for firm i as (29)> (28). Clearly the same argument holds for 1 2* *F F F  .
The same argument can also be applied for some values of fixed costs such
that 2 3* *F F F  . However not for all 2 3* *F F F  because when 3 *F F
0mon  so for some 2 3* *F F F  :
2* ( , ( ))mon mon j monF q BR q   (30)
Appendix 3.2
If both firms produce the monopoly output simultaneously, using (10) and (1):
 ( , ) 2( ) / 2mon monp q q a b a c b c    (31)
Therefore from (31) and (10);
( , ) ( )mon mon monq q c c q F F     (32)
Given these output decisions consumer surplus is;
2( ) / 2p cCS a c b   (33)
Define as the probability that ‘mistakes’ occur. 
Consumer surplus is higher iff is sufficiently high such that:
( ) (1 )p c mon courCS CS CS     (34)
Therefore using (19), (20) and (33);
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2 2 2(( ) / 2 ) (1 )(( ) / 8 ) 2( ) / 9a c b a c b a c b       (35)
Solving for:
0.26 (36)
Appendix 4.1
Assume firm 1 takes the action which raises fixed costs.
If 1 3* *F F F  assume firm 1 is restricted to only the 3 possible strategies for which
a Nash equilibria is possible; monq , courq and exit . However, it is then trivial to rule out
the strategy exit as it is strictly dominated by the strategy of not raising fixed costs
and producing the Cournot equilibrium quantity (exiting the industry yields zero
profits compared to the positive profits at the Cournot equilibrium with no fixed
costs).
Once it has raised fixed costs firm 1 therefore has 2 possible strategies; monq and courq .
Attach a probability  to firm 1 producing the monopoly output, this means that firm
1 exits the industry with probability (1 ) . In addition restrict firm 1 to pure
strategies i.e.:
(0,1) (37)
Firm 2 has 3 possible strategies monq , courq and exit .
Now considerfirm 2’s payoff from each strategy conditional on:
If 1 :
exit : 0 (38)
courq : 2 ( , )cour monq q F  (39)
monq : 2 ( , )mon monq q F F   (40)
From (32):
2 ( , )mon monq q F F  
Using (10) and (15):
2
2 ( , ) ( ) /18cour monq q F a c b F     (41)
Using (14) it can be shown that:
2 ( , ) 0cour monq q F   for all 1 *F F (42)
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As (38) is greater than (42) and (40) the optimal strategy for firm 2 given 1 is to
exit the industry.
If 0 :
exit : 0 (43)
courq : 2 ( , )cour courq q F  (44)
monq : 2 ( , )mon courq q F  (45)
Given (6) and (15):
2 2( , ) ( , )cour cour mon courq q F q q F    for all F (46)
Using (17) and (18):
2 ( , ) 0cour courq q F   for 1 2* *F F F  (47)
2 ( , ) 0cour courq q F   for 2 3* *F F F  (48)
The optimal strategy for firm 2 given 0 is therefore to produce courq if
1 2* *F F F  and exit if 2 3* *F F F  .
Now considerfirm 1’s payoffs conditional on givenfirm 2’soptimal strategies:
1 : mon F  (49)
0 : cour F  if 1 2* *F F F  or ,( 0)courq if 2 3* *F F F  (50)
From (17) and (18):
mon courF F   
Given (10) and (6):
( ,0)mon courF q F    (51)
Therefore, firm 1 raising fixed costs and producing the monopoly output is a Sub-
game Perfect Nash Equilibrium. In contrast firm 1 raising fixed costs and exiting the
industry or producing the Cournot output are not Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibria.
In addition when fixed costs are not raised the Cournot equilibrium is a Sub-game
Perfect Nash Equilibrium.
Appendix 4.2
Proof of Proposition 5:
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Using forward induction when considering whether to raise fixed costs firm 1 can
compare the payoffs from the two outcomes:
For all 1 3* *F F F  as shown in Appendix 4.1firm 1’spayoffs are:
Raise fixed-costs: mon F  (52)
Not raise fixed costs: cour (53)
For 1 2* *F F F  using (14) and (17):
mon courF   (54)
Therefore it is more profitable for firm 1 to raise fixed costs.
This forward induction refinement can also be used for some levels of fixed costs
such that 2 3* *F F F  . However, once fixed costs are sufficiently high the Cournot
outcome with no fixed costs yields higher profits.
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